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Saturday, August 12, 2017

Comelec Chairman Andy Bautista Placed His Unexplained Wealth in a Failing Bank






Besieged  Comelec Chairman Andy Bautista claimed in an interview with ABS-CBN's Karen Davila (beginning at 21:00 of the above video) that he had been acting as "the designated family treasurer" for his parents and siblings since as late as the 1990s.

“Most of [it] belong[s] to my parents, my brother and my sister,” Bautista told the Inquirer. He was referring to his brother, Martin, and sister, Susan Bautista-Afan. Most of the passbooks were in the name of Bautista and his parents. At least one showed the name of Susan and another was a joint account with Patricia. Martin’s name was not on any of the passbooks in Patricia’s possession. 
Bautista said Martin was doing well as a doctor in the United States, while Susan also earned substantially when she lived in United States. Susan, a dual citizen, is now with ABS-CBN Foundation.

In a subsequent interview with GMA News, brother Martin Bautista claimed that he had at least US $1.75 million (around Php 87.5 million) with his brother Andy, earned from his successful medical practice in the US.



This information begs several questions:

Why was Andy Bautista continuing to act as a "designated family treasurer" even after he assumed very high profile government posts since 2010?

As an accomplished legal professional, Andy should be very cognizant that any money linked to him, whether from his siblings or parents, must be beyond reproach. As the former head of the PCGG, whose chief job is to go after the hidden wealth of the Marcoses, Andy chased after their money trail (which has long gone cold) and would go after any and possibly all leads that linked onshore and offshore bank accounts to the Marcoses. Was he not aware that these bank accounts could be construed as unexplained wealth? Maybe he did not think that the same standards he applied to the Marcoses could also be applied to him? Or perhaps the lessons of the Corona impeachment, where legitimately obtained assets that remain undeclared in his SALN could be severe grounds for impeachment, did not sink in?

Why didn't Andy Bautista create some form of "blind trust" for his family's money, that would erect a legal barrier between him and his family's money? As a top lawyer, he could have possibly drawn up the trust himself or gotten help from his extensive network in the legal profession.

Why didn't Andy Bautista just hand off the management of his family money to another competent financial professional when he assumed government posts way back in 2010?

As a former head of the Kuok Group Philippines and as a former international lawyer specializing in mergers and acquisitions and/or project finance, Andy Bautista would have had the network to entrust this matter to another very capable finance professional.

Why did Andy Bautista put a significant chunk of his family money in Luzon Development Bank (LDB), a small development bank?

One of the chief tenets of a treasurer is to manage risk. As designated family treasurer, he was tasked with three things:


  1. Preservation of Capital
  2. Liquidity
  3. Growth
Preservation of Capital

A cursory look at LDB's published statement of financial condition as of March 2017 would reveal that the bank is not very stable.







First of all, it is losing money at an annualized rate of -35.01% as of the first quarter 2017. At Php 620.88 million, its Gross Non-Performing Loans (Gross NPLs) is almost twice its Stockholder's Equity of Php 345.43 million. So any large write-off of these NPLs could severely impair a very large chunk of its equity. As of March 2017, LDB's Total Capital Adequacy Ratio (Total CAR), the BSP's preferred measure of financial strength, stood at 6.74, barely above BSP's minimum of 6.00 and way below BSP's recommended minimum of 10.00.

LDB has routinely been flagged by this author as one of the Top Distressed Banks in the Philippines since March 2014. As of March 2017, the ratio of its Distressed Assets to its Total Capital Cushion is 182.24%, significantly above the threshold of 100% at which a bank is considered risky.

If and when the bank goes bust, the deposits of Andy's family would be insured up to a maximum of Php 500,000.00 per depositor. So, if the bank goes bust, Andy's family deposits are insured for less than 1% of what he is purported to have just in LDB.

Liquidity

With only Php 5.75 billion in Assets and only Php 5.07 billion in deposits, LDB is a small bank. By depositing anwhere from Php 200 million to as much as Php 329 million in just one bank, these deposits would amount to as much as 3.94% to 6.57% of the bank's deposity liabilities. This is a fairly sizeable position in the bank. Moreover, as of March 31, 2017, the bank only had Php 141.83 million in cash. So, any substantial withdrawal (like Php 50 million or more) would cause the bank some cash flow problems. It would take a few days for the bank to withdraw some of its reserves with the Philippine Central Bank (BSP) to fund a substantial withdrawal by the Bautista family.

Growth

Since June 2013, LDB's deposits grew from around Php 2.54 billion as of June 2013 to as much as Php 5.22 billion just three years later - June 2016.


As a consequence of this rapid growth in deposits, it's loan portfolio grew very fast too, from just Php 1.79 billion as of June 2013 to as high as Php 3.49 billion in March 2015. 



However, the growth in LDB's loan portfolio was outpaced by the rapid growth in NPLs. As of June 2013, only 11.67% of the bank's Total Loan Portfolio consisted of NPLs. Today, as of March 2017, that figure now stands at its highest ever: 20.35% of Total Loans.


Since March 2015, LDB began to lose money at an alarming rate. Its Return on Equity dropped to a negative 37.77% annualized rate and has had a negative 30% handle since then.



As a result of its massive losses, LDB's Stockholder's Equity is a shadow of its former self.



Not surprisingly, its Capital Adequacy Ratios, BSP's preferred indicator of financial strength, has consistently gone downhill and has fallen below BSP's own recommended minimum of 10.00%.



Lately, its Distressed Asset Ratio has hit a new high and has climbed above 100%, the threshold at which a bank is considered risky, since March 2015.

What could explain why Andy Bautista put so much money in LDB? Thinking Pinoy has advanced one theory.



But another explanation could be much more prosaic. It's possible that LDB that in this low interest rate environment, the bank was not earning much with a Return on Equity of 1.26% as of September 2013. The bank might have been forced to jack up rates on deposits to enlarge its deposit base. That would have attracted a lot of depositors, including the deposits from Andy Bautista's family.  But LDB had to earn a spread over its jacked up rates, meaning the interest rates on its loans would have been jacked up as well. But the massive growth in deposits meant that this money had to be lent out and soon. Its lending standards could have gone down or the only borrowers who would be willing to take up the higher interest loans would have been the riskier ones. Hence, the massive rise in NPLs and losses for LDB.

Now where have we heard this story before?


Friday, July 21, 2017

A Tale of Two Markets: China vs. Hong Kong Residential Real Estate

Home Prices in China, as measured by Shanghai Home Prices, have recently begun to plateau, signifying a possible slowdown in the real estate sector for 2017. 

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Hong Kong Home Prices have resumed their upward trend after dipping in 2016 and have hit new highs as of the first quarter of 2017.

Both real estate markets have surpassed their inflation adjusted levels by a very wide margin.

What happens next is anyone's guess. Stay tuned.

Related Links:

How low can Hong Kong Property Prices Go? Some Clues from the Not Too Distant Past.

After a 10% Market Decline in Late 2015 to Early 2016, Hong Kong Home Prices Resume Their Relentless Upward Trend in late 2016


Friday, July 14, 2017

The (Un)Steady State of Philippine Real Estate in 2016



At 109.77%, 8990 Holdings still has the most Real Estate Receivables relative to its Stockholder's Equity in 2016. Next is Century Properties at 70.49% of Stockholder's Equity, followed by Ayala Land at 46.92% of Stockholder's Equity.


Naturally, 8990 Holdings still has the most problematic Real Estate Receivables. Problem Real Estate Receivables amount to 11.10% of its Stockholder's Equity as of 2016. Believe it or not, this figure is way down from the 20.40% it posted in 2015.  Ayala Land's Problem Real Estate Receivables amount to 6.72% of its Stockholder's Equity in 2016. Neck and neck for third place are SM Prime Holdings and SM Investments with Problem Real Estate Receivables amounting to 3.68% and 3.61% of their respective Stockholder's Equity.

 SM Prime Holdings also holds the dubious distinction of having the highest percentage of Past Due But Not Impaired Real Estate Receivables relative to Total Real Estate Receivables in 2016. This is closely followed by Ayala Land with 14.63% of its Real Estate Receivables in Past Due status. Both Vista Land and 8990 Holdings have similar ratios with 9.58% (Vista Land) and 9.44% (8990 Holdings) of its Real Estate Receivables falling Past Due in 2016.



Related Posts:

Ayala Land's Real Estate Receivables Problem Has Gotten Worse, Not Better

8990 Holdings Inc.'s 2016 Annual Report: What a Difference an Auditor Makes!

8990 Holdings Inc.'s Impaired Installment Contracts Receivable (ICRs): The Pig Has Finally Broken Out of the Python!

The Philippine Real Estate Bubble Has Also Burst For... Ayala Land!

The Philippine Real Estate Bubble Has Also Burst for Vista Land

The Philippine Real Estate Bubble Has Already Burst for HOUSE (8990 Holdings, Inc.)

Friday, July 7, 2017

The Unbearable Volatility of BSP's Residential Real Estate Price Index

Perhaps because the index has been in its infancy but according to BSP's Residential Real Estate Price Index (RREPI) investors in residential real estate have been experiencing a nausea-inducing roller-coaster ride in terms of asset prices.

The swings in the areas outside the National Capital Region (Ex-NCR) are particularly problematic. Within the past two years, RREPI - All Types for the Ex-NCR area has swung from a high of 125.7 in the second quarter of 2016 from a low of 106.2 as of the 2nd Qtr. of 2015, an increase of 15.51% in just one year. Then in the next quarter, the index drops by 10.74% to 112.2 as of the 3rd Qtr of 2016. The RREPI - All Types index for the Ex-NCR area now rests at 116.8 as of the 1st Qtr 2017 or 4.10% higher than what it was just two quarters ago.


This volatility of the Ex-NCR RREPI-All Types has influenced large swings in the overall Philippine RREPI-All Types. Since its inception, the nationwide index has swung 10.18% from bottom to top. No doubt, the volatility of the Philippine-wide RREPI-All Types was tempered by the low volatility of the NCR RREPI - All Types, which fluctuated by only 2.63% from peak to trough.

The same dynamic has been playing out as you drill down into the index's sub-sectors, whether they be Single Detached Homes, Duplex, Townhouses, or Condominiums. Ex-NCR is volatile while NCR has smoother fluctuations, leading to a more volatile nationwide index for each sub-sector.
















The Philippines was one of the last countries in the ASEAN to institute a National Residential Real Estate Index. Other countries have done this much sooner. However, late is better than never. In the meantime, for planning purposes, the index has limited utility.

Tuesday, July 4, 2017

Great Depression vs. Great Recession GDP Growth Rates - Third Estimate of the First Quarter of 2017

Last Thursday, June 29, 2017, the Bureau of Economic Analysis released their third estimate of 2017's first quarter GDP growth rate: 1.40%. For the fourth quarter of 2016, GDP grew by 2.1%.



The economic recovery from the Great Recession has been downright sluggish, never taking off beyond the 3.00% growth rate that signals a robust economic recovery and always flirting with the 1.00% growth rate that signals a stalling economy.



On a nominal basis, the economy is 31% larger than what it was ten years ago. In real terms, it's just 13% larger.



On a per capita basis, real GDP grew by only 5.34% for the past ten years, for a compounded annual average growth rate of only 0.52% per annum - far less than the so-called "Hindu Rate of Growth" threshold of 1.30% per annum. This growth rate is so slow that it is almost imperceptible.






To top it all, the growth has not been evenly distributed. As of year-end 2015, Real Median Household Income stood at $56,516 or 1.58% below the Real Median Household Income of $57,423 in 2007 and 2.41% below that of 1999 ($57,909). Almost all the gains in the economy have been going to the upper echelons of US society.






Friday, June 23, 2017

Construction Gross Value as a Percentage of GDP Is Near a 25 Year High! - Updated as of 1st Qtr. 2017

Last May 4, 2015, we noted that Construction Gross Value (Construction GV) at 11.21% as of the year-end 2014 was already well above its historical average of 9.65% of GDP since 1990.  This ratio has run at an above average rate since 2009 and has already eaten away at the "cumulative underhang" or underinvestment in construction that has taken place since 2004, when the excessive investment in construction that took place in the mid to late 1990's was being absorbed.




As of the 1st Qtr of 2017, Construction GV as a percentage of GDP now stands higher at 12.01% of GDP -near the all-time high of 12.22% (posted in the 4th Qtr 2016) for the past 25 years.  But the real story is that Cumulative Construction GV has gone well above equilibrium and now stands at 4.9% above equilibrium, a rise of 4.9% in just fifteen months.  Given all the planned new projects that are already at the execution stage, the momentum in Construction Investment will continue.






Friday, June 16, 2017

Singapore Continues its Controlled Slide of House Prices While Philippine House Prices Hit New Highs in 2017 Q1

Almost all countries discussed in this blog post, with the exception of Thailand, have been experiencing rapid growth in home prices that have outstripped inflation by a wide margin.  The gap between home prices and their inflation adjusted levels are at the widest ever, particularly in Singapore, Hong Kong, and the Philippines.

Singapore

Singapore's home prices have now been declining for fourteen straight quarters, which, according to Bloomberg, is the longest losing streak in five years.  Home prices are still  66.32% above their year-end 2004 levels. Overall prices levels, as measured by inflation have just increased by 29.19% since year end 2004.  In other words, for the past ten years, Singaporean home prices have outpaced inflation by almost than 40 percentage points.


Malaysia


Neighboring Malaysia's House Price Index now stands at 262.42 as of the third quarter 2016, 162.42% higher than year-end 1998 levels.  General price levels as of the third quarter 2016 are only around 48.41% higher than their year-end 1998 levels.


Thailand


In Thailand, which has been experiencing political turmoil for some time, home prices have remained essentially flat since the end of 2004. Home Prices ended 2013 with the index at 100.54, just 0.54% higher than the end of 2004, but showing a substantial recovery since the recent low of 74.08 posted in the third quarter of 2009. Since 2013, home prices have rebounded to 114.50 or 14.50% higher than its year-end 2004 levels, way below its expected inflation adjusted levels. General Price levels are 34.51% above their year-end 2004 levels. In other words, Thailand Home Prices have lagged inflation by as much as 20.01% since their year-end 2004 levels.


Indonesia

Meanwhile, in Indonesia, home prices have shown no signs of slowing down their upward trajectory.  In fact, prices are now at 146.32 or 46.32% above their first quarter 2007 levels. Inflation, however, has marched higher.  General prices are 77.52% above first quarter 2007 levels, lagging inflation by 31.20%.



Philippines


Philippine house price index stands at 225.44% as of the first quarter 2017 or over 125.44% above their year-end 2004 levels.  Philippine home prices have posted one of the largest 10 year gains among all the countries considered in this blog post.  Philippine home prices have outstripped inflation by more than sixty percentage points.  General prices stood at 164.63% or 64.63% above their year-end 2004 levels. Like Indonesia, Philippine home prices have so far no signs of slowing down their upward trajectory for the foreseeable future.   The question is, is this momentum sustainable?  Or will the Philippines and Indonesia follow its ASEAN neighbors, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand, in exhibiting plateauing or declining house prices?  That remains to be seen.