In the last twelve years, Income Inequality in the Philippines has declined substantially, primarily because income growth in the lowest classes have outpaced that of the upper classes. From 2006 to 2018, average per capita incomes for the poorest decile grew by a CAGR of 11.1% a year, while the incomes for the richest decile grew by a CAGR of only 2.81% during the same period. The average Filipino's income also grew by a decent CAGR of 5.1% a year. As a result, the richest decile, which once towered over the poorest decile by almost 20 times income in 2006, now has a less intimidating ratio of less than 8 times income of the poorest class. For the average Filipino, that ratio has been cut in half, from 5.4 times the poorest decile in 2006 to just 2.8 times in 2018.
Related Links: Why Do Filipinos Love Duterte So Much? Because Income Growth was Fastest Among the Poorer Classes!
Source: Family Income and Expenditure Survey 2018
Search This Blog
Sunday, February 9, 2020
Sunday, February 2, 2020
Just How Reasonable are the Rates of Return of the Water Concessionaires: Manila Water Company and Maynilad?
President Duterte has gone to war with two of the biggest oligarchs in the country, namely the Ayalas and Manny Pangilinan, who operate the water concessionaires Manila Water and Maynilad. He has threatened to arrest them and have them thrown in jail for plunder and syndicated estafa. Specifically, they have been accused of the following:
As a result, the MWSS has cancelled the extension of the water contracts to 2037 and the government is drafting revised water concession contracts that exclude the terms the President considers onerous.
Plunging Share Prices
Unsurprisingly, with their futures in limbo, the stocks of the water concessionaires have taken deep dives since the President launched his war late last year but have recovered some ground with the prospect of impending contract renegotiations.
Here is the chart for Manila Water:
And here's the chart for Metro Pacific Investments Corporation, Maynilad Water Services' holding company. Maynilad itself was publicly listed in the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) until its voluntary delisting in 2017.
Impressive Financials
Both companies have been among the biggest and most profitable companies listed in the PSE, pulling roughly Php 20.0 billion (US$ 392 million) in revenues and Php 6.0 billion (US$ 118 million) in net income each.
Naturally, both companies have stacked up very decent rates of return for their respective shareholders in the last five years. For instance, Manila Water's Return on Equity (ROE) for the last five years (2014 to 2018 plus the last 12 months) have averaged 14.34%. Maynilad's ROE (2015 to 2017) was an even more impressive 21.41%.
Global Comparisons
Now how do these returns stack up, globally?
After scanning Capital IQ for publicly-listed companies comparable to the Water Concessionaires, I arrived at a list of 74 companies that are primarily in the business of Water Supply. Here's the list:
Some are big, some are small. Many are in China or the ASEAN. But in every case, both Manila Water and Maynilad's Rates of Return tended to gravitate to the upper end of the spectrum, be it globally, Asia-wide, or in Southeast Asia and in every category of return. Manila Water's returns are highlighted in orange while Maynilad's are highlighted in yellow.
Global Returns:
Asian Returns:
Statistical Rankings
Both Manila Water's and Maynilad's Rates of Return are far above average on a global, Asian-wide, and Southeast Asian-wide basis.
Manila Water's Rates of Return are above the 75th percentile (meaning only 25% of the companies have higher returns) globally and in Southeast Asia in terms of ROA and ROC. Asia-wide, its returns are at least in the 83rd percentile in all categories of returns.
Maynilad's Rates of Return rank above the 90th percentile in all geographic categories and in all categories of return except one: global Return on Common Equity (ROCE) - where it ranks in the 65th percentile.
Conclusion:
The impending contract renegotiations and removal of the provisions deemed "onerous" by the Duterte administration will inevitably result in a much slower growth in water tariffs and higher costs for the water concessionaires. They will no longer be able to pass on their income tax burdens to the consumers, they will have to build expensive water treatment plants, and they will no longer enjoy uncontested and automatic rate increases.
All this will serve to lower their rates of return and align them with international averages. The returns of Manila Water and Maynilad will closely resemble that of a regular water utility stock: safe but boring.
Source: Capital IQ, www.edge.pse.com.ph
- Renegotiating and extending their 1997 contracts thirteen years prior to their expiration in 2022 without the benefit of public bidding.
- Attaching onerous provisions in the revised contracts that include transferring their income tax burden to the consumers and prohibiting government regulators, the MWSS (Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System), from discharging its mandate to regulate the rate of charges that the companies will collect from the consumers.
- Collecting environmental fees intended to build water treatment facilities without actually building such facilities, resulting in the pollution of Manila Bay.
As a result, the MWSS has cancelled the extension of the water contracts to 2037 and the government is drafting revised water concession contracts that exclude the terms the President considers onerous.
Plunging Share Prices
Unsurprisingly, with their futures in limbo, the stocks of the water concessionaires have taken deep dives since the President launched his war late last year but have recovered some ground with the prospect of impending contract renegotiations.
Here is the chart for Manila Water:
And here's the chart for Metro Pacific Investments Corporation, Maynilad Water Services' holding company. Maynilad itself was publicly listed in the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) until its voluntary delisting in 2017.
Impressive Financials
Both companies have been among the biggest and most profitable companies listed in the PSE, pulling roughly Php 20.0 billion (US$ 392 million) in revenues and Php 6.0 billion (US$ 118 million) in net income each.
Naturally, both companies have stacked up very decent rates of return for their respective shareholders in the last five years. For instance, Manila Water's Return on Equity (ROE) for the last five years (2014 to 2018 plus the last 12 months) have averaged 14.34%. Maynilad's ROE (2015 to 2017) was an even more impressive 21.41%.
Global Comparisons
Now how do these returns stack up, globally?
After scanning Capital IQ for publicly-listed companies comparable to the Water Concessionaires, I arrived at a list of 74 companies that are primarily in the business of Water Supply. Here's the list:
| Company Name | Exchange:Ticker | Country of Operations | Revenue (US$ M) | Market Cap (US$ M) |
| Aguas Andinas S.A. (SNSE:AGUAS-A) | SNSE:AGUAS-A | Chile | 703.00 | 2,622.70 |
| American States Water Company (NYSE:AWR) | NYSE:AWR | California | 471.90 | 3,107.00 |
| American Water Works Company, Inc. (NYSE:AWK) | NYSE:AWK | USA | 3,558.00 | 22,519.30 |
| Aqua Spólka Akcyjna (WSE:AQU) | WSE:AQU | Poland | 40.71 | 54.47 |
| AquaVenture Holdings Limited (NYSE:WAAS) | NYSE:WAAS | Americas | 192.70 | 856.00 |
| Artesian Resources Corporation (NasdaqGS:ARTN.A) | NasdaqGS:ARTN.A | USA | 81.90 | 344.40 |
| AS Tallinna Vesi (TLSE:TVEAT) | TLSE:TVEAT | Estonia | 70.90 | 259.90 |
| Athens Water Supply and Sewerage Company S.A. (ATSE:EYDAP) | ATSE:EYDAP | Greece | 357.70 | 895.80 |
| Beijing Capital Co.,Ltd (SHSE:600008) | SHSE:600008 | China | 7,873.40 | |
| Beijing Enterprises Water Group Limited (SEHK:371) | SEHK:371 | Global | 3,528.10 | 5,235.50 |
| Beijing Water Business Doctor Co., Ltd. (SZSE:300055) | SZSE:300055 | China | 130.30 | 905.30 |
| Ben Thanh Water Supply Joint Stock Company (HNX:BTW) | HNX:BTW | Vietnam | 20.10 | 9.43 |
| Binh Duong Water - Environment Joint Stock Company (HOSE:BWE) | HOSE:BWE | Vietnam | 109.60 | 142.10 |
| Bohai Water Industry Co.,Ltd (SZSE:000605) | SZSE:000605 | China | 232.90 | 368.00 |
| California Water Service Group (NYSE:CWT) | NYSE:CWT | USA | 705.10 | 2,383.20 |
| Chengdu Xingrong Environment Co., Ltd. (SZSE:000598) | SZSE:000598 | China | 643.90 | 2,033.50 |
| China Everbright Water Limited (SGX:U9E) | SGX:U9E | China | 673.10 | 690.70 |
| China International Holdings Limited (SGX:BEH) | SGX:BEH | China | 10.26 | 16.90 |
| China Water Affairs Group Limited (SEHK:855) | SEHK:855 | China | 1,095.70 | 1,250.80 |
| China Water Industry Group Limited (SEHK:1129) | SEHK:1129 | China | 124.30 | 97.60 |
| Chongqing Water Group Co.,Ltd. (SHSE:601158) | SHSE:601158 | China | 818.70 | 3,956.80 |
| Compagnie des Eaux de Royan (ENXTPA:MLEDR) | ENXTPA:MLEDR | France | 41.93 | 26.61 |
| Companhia Catarinense de Águas e Saneamento - CASAN (BOVESPA:CASN3) | BOVESPA:CASN3 | Brazil | 264.90 | |
| Companhia de Saneamento Básico do Estado de São Paulo - SABESP (BOVESPA:SBSP3) | BOVESPA:SBSP3 | Brazil | 4,351.00 | 10,007.80 |
| Companhia de Saneamento de Minas Gerais (BOVESPA:CSMG3) | BOVESPA:CSMG3 | Brazil | 1,196.80 | 2,049.30 |
| Companhia de Saneamento do Paraná - SANEPAR (BOVESPA:SAPR4) | BOVESPA:SAPR4 | Brazil | 1,071.90 | 2,406.70 |
| Consolidated Water Co. Ltd. (NasdaqGS:CWCO) | NasdaqGS:CWCO | Global | 69.20 | 251.30 |
| Eastern Water Resources Development and Management Public Company Limited (SET:EASTW) | SET:EASTW | Thailand | 150.80 | 636.80 |
| Essbio S.A. (SNSE:ESSBIO-C) | SNSE:ESSBIO-C | Chile | 217.30 | 409.10 |
| Esval S.A. (SNSE:ESVAL-C) | SNSE:ESVAL-C | Chile | 253.70 | 328.10 |
| Global Water Resources, Inc. (NasdaqGM:GWRS) | NasdaqGM:GWRS | USA | 35.04 | 276.53 |
| Grandblue Environment Co., Ltd. (SHSE:600323) | SHSE:600323 | China | 802.80 | 2,219.70 |
| Guangdong Investment Limited (SEHK:270) | SEHK:270 | China | 1,899.70 | 14,122.20 |
| Guangxi Nanning Waterworks Co., Ltd. (SHSE:601368) | SHSE:601368 | China | 210.20 | 757.30 |
| Heilongjiang Interchina Water Treatment Co.,Ltd. (SHSE:600187) | SHSE:600187 | China | 66.70 | 615.70 |
| Hyflux Ltd (OTCPK:HYFX.F) | OTCPK:HYFX.F | Global | 111.60 | 7.90 |
| Iguá Saneamento S.A. (BOVESPA:IGSN3) | BOVESPA:IGSN3 | Brazil | 214.30 | |
| Inversiones Aguas Metropolitanas S.A. (SNSE:IAM) | SNSE:IAM | Chile | 703.00 | 1,071.90 |
| Jiangsu Jiangnan Water Co., Ltd. (SHSE:601199) | SHSE:601199 | China | 138.30 | 528.00 |
| Jiangxi Hongcheng Waterworks Co., Ltd. (SHSE:600461) | SHSE:600461 | China | 689.60 | 835.40 |
| Kunming Dianchi Water Treatment Co., Ltd. (SEHK:3768) | SEHK:3768 | China | 230.00 | 309.70 |
| Luzhou Xinglu Water (Group) Co., Ltd. (SEHK:2281) | SEHK:2281 | China | 207.80 | 147.00 |
| Lydec S.A. (CBSE:LYD) | CBSE:LYD | Morocco | 786.20 | 401.30 |
| Manila Water Company, Inc. (PSE:MWC) | Philippines | 417.10 | 462.80 | |
| Middlesex Water Company (NasdaqGS:MSEX) | NasdaqGS:MSEX | USA | 135.10 | 1,084.40 |
| Muscat City Desalination Company S.A.O.C. (MSM:MCDE) | MSM:MCDE | Oman | 43.67 | 43.64 |
| New England Service Company, Inc. (OTCPK:NESW) | OTCPK:NESW | USA | 7.52 | 21.49 |
| Nha Be Water Supply Joint Stock Company (HNX:NBW) | HNX:NBW | Vietnam | 28.29 | 20.14 |
| PBA Holdings Bhd (KLSE:PBA) | KLSE:PBA | Malaysia | 83.30 | 88.00 |
| Pennon Group Plc (LSE:PNN) | LSE:PNN | United Kingdom | 1,869.20 | 5,822.40 |
| Puncak Niaga Holdings Berhad (KLSE:PUNCAK) | KLSE:PUNCAK | Malaysia | 106.00 | 33.00 |
| Pure Cycle Corporation (NasdaqCM:PCYO) | NasdaqCM:PCYO | USA | 27.75 | 296.05 |
| Qian Jiang Water Resources Development Co;Ltd (SHSE:600283) | SHSE:600283 | China | 165.30 | 522.00 |
| Ranhill Holdings Berhad (KLSE:RANHILL) | KLSE:RANHILL | Global | 406.80 | 280.10 |
| Saigon Water Infrastructure Corporation (HOSE:SII) | HOSE:SII | Vietnam | 7.82 | 49.73 |
| Salcon Berhad (KLSE:SALCON) | KLSE:SALCON | Malaysia | 43.26 | 43.05 |
| Severn Trent Plc (LSE:SVT) | LSE:SVT | United Kingdom | 2,344.40 | 7,997.20 |
| SIIC Environment Holdings Ltd. (SGX:BHK) | SGX:BHK | China | 853.60 | 512.00 |
| SJW Group (NYSE:SJW) | NYSE:SJW | USA | 393.40 | 1,976.00 |
| Société de Distribution d'Eau de la Côte d'Ivoire, S.A. (BRVM:SDCC) | BRVM:SDCC | Ivory Coast | 176.60 | 42.70 |
| Taliworks Corporation Berhad (KLSE:TALIWRK) | KLSE:TALIWRK | Malaysia | 90.70 | 431.50 |
| The Torrington Water Company (OTCPK:TORW) | OTCPK:TORW | USA | 7.34 | 35.42 |
| The York Water Company (NasdaqGS:YORW) | NasdaqGS:YORW | 50.60 | 622.00 | |
| Thessaloniki Water Supply & Sewerage Co S.A. (ATSE:EYAPS) | ATSE:EYAPS | Greece | 76.80 | 192.70 |
| Thu Duc Water Supply Joint Stock Company (HOSE:TDW) | HOSE:TDW | Vietnam | 21.13 | 8.80 |
| TTW Public Company Limited (SET:TTW) | SET:TTW | Thailand | 201.40 | 1,830.10 |
| United Utilities Group PLC (LSE:UU.) | LSE:UU. | United Kingdom | 2,393.80 | 8,867.70 |
| Universal Technologies Holdings Limited (SEHK:1026) | SEHK:1026 | China | 34.54 | 148.32 |
| Watlington Waterworks Limited (BER:WWW.BH) | BER:WWW.BH | Bermuda | 11.99 | 26.66 |
| WHA Utilities and Power Public Company Limited (SET:WHAUP) | SET:WHAUP | Thailand | 59.60 | 731.60 |
| Wodkan Przedsiebiorstwo Wodociagów i Kanalizacji S.A. (WSE:WOD) | WSE:WOD | Poland | 9.82 | 8.36 |
| Wuhan Sanzhen Industry Holding Co.,Ltd (SHSE:600168) | SHSE:600168 | China | 225.70 | 710.50 |
| Yunnan Water Investment Co., Limited (SEHK:6839) | SEHK:6839 | China | 912.90 | 255.10 |
| Zhongshan Public Utilities Group Co.,Ltd. (SZSE:000685) | SZSE:000685 | China | 300.10 | 1,821.80 |
Some are big, some are small. Many are in China or the ASEAN. But in every case, both Manila Water and Maynilad's Rates of Return tended to gravitate to the upper end of the spectrum, be it globally, Asia-wide, or in Southeast Asia and in every category of return. Manila Water's returns are highlighted in orange while Maynilad's are highlighted in yellow.
Global Returns:
Asian Returns:
Southeast Asian Returns:
Statistical Rankings
Both Manila Water's and Maynilad's Rates of Return are far above average on a global, Asian-wide, and Southeast Asian-wide basis.
Manila Water's Rates of Return are above the 75th percentile (meaning only 25% of the companies have higher returns) globally and in Southeast Asia in terms of ROA and ROC. Asia-wide, its returns are at least in the 83rd percentile in all categories of returns.
Maynilad's Rates of Return rank above the 90th percentile in all geographic categories and in all categories of return except one: global Return on Common Equity (ROCE) - where it ranks in the 65th percentile.
Conclusion:
The impending contract renegotiations and removal of the provisions deemed "onerous" by the Duterte administration will inevitably result in a much slower growth in water tariffs and higher costs for the water concessionaires. They will no longer be able to pass on their income tax burdens to the consumers, they will have to build expensive water treatment plants, and they will no longer enjoy uncontested and automatic rate increases.
All this will serve to lower their rates of return and align them with international averages. The returns of Manila Water and Maynilad will closely resemble that of a regular water utility stock: safe but boring.
Source: Capital IQ, www.edge.pse.com.ph
Monday, January 27, 2020
Why Do Filipinos Love Duterte So Much? Because Income Growth was Fastest Among the Poorer Classes!
Incomes grew across the board.
The ratio of the highest income decile to the lowest income decile has narrowed, reducing income inequality further.
Source: FIES Philippines, 2012, 2015, and 2018, Philippine Statistical Authority
Thursday, November 28, 2019
In 2018, Even Ayala Land Had a Less Than Stellar Year
Last time we looked at Ayala Land, its Installment Contract Receivables (ICRs) problem had gotten worse and not better.
In 2018, things are looking better - much better. A lot of its ICRs were sold off to affiliates like BPI Family Bank and the overall level of ICRs have gone down substantially.
But credit quality remains a problem.
As a percentage of the remaining ICRs, total past due and impaired ICRs has not changed much.
Ayala Land's Real Estate Receivables Problem Has Gotten Worse, Not Better
The Philippine Real Estate Bubble Has Also Burst For... Ayala Land!
In 2018, things are looking better - much better. A lot of its ICRs were sold off to affiliates like BPI Family Bank and the overall level of ICRs have gone down substantially.
But credit quality remains a problem.
As a percentage of the remaining ICRs, total past due and impaired ICRs has not changed much.
Ayala Land's Real Estate Receivables Problem Has Gotten Worse, Not Better
The Philippine Real Estate Bubble Has Also Burst For... Ayala Land!
Tuesday, November 19, 2019
Hong Kong Real Estate Prices Have Budged - But Only A Little - as of 3rd Qtr. 2019
On a monthly basis, Hong Kong Real Estate Prices have started showing some declines. But the declines are minimal. They have not reached correction levels of 10% or more.
But on a year-on-year basis, prices have merely flattened.
And the most expensive class, Class E (>160 sq. m.), has declined the most but have not reached the magnitudes of past declines.
Hong Kong House Prices Haven't Budged - Yet
How low can Hong Kong Property Prices Go? Some Clues from the Not Too Distant Past.
But on a year-on-year basis, prices have merely flattened.
Even by class, prices have flattened.
And the most expensive class, Class E (>160 sq. m.), has declined the most but have not reached the magnitudes of past declines.
Hong Kong House Prices Haven't Budged - Yet
How low can Hong Kong Property Prices Go? Some Clues from the Not Too Distant Past.
Wednesday, November 13, 2019
How Crazy is the Philippine Real Estate Market? Prices have Climbed Almost 50% Since Duterte Took Office!
Philippine house prices have gone parabolic. They have climbed 49.30% since President Duterte took office in the second half of 2016. Year-on-year price increase as of the 3rd Qtr 2019 is an astounding 21.20%. Prices have outpaced inflation by a wide margin, 139.88 percentage points.
How long can this go on? Not long, considering sales volumes dropped by more than 25% in 2018, indicating that more and more people cannot afford the high price levels.
Tuesday, November 5, 2019
The Not So Obvious Real Estate Bubbles
We all know about the high price of real estate in San Francisco and Los Angeles. Both metro areas boast one of the highest Median Home Price to Median Income ratios in the country. In 2018, the ratio for Los Angeles was an eye-watering 9.44 times median income. San Francisco was not too far behind with a ratio of 9.24 times median income. The sheer unaffordability of many homes has spawned a crisis of homelessness in those cities. Even tech workers, whose high wages have pushed up real estate prices in Silicon Valley, are forced to sleep in their cars and vans.
Yet those real estate markets are not technically in a bubble, and their ratios are just a shade over one standard deviation of their historical house price to income ratios. For instance, LA's historical ratio for the past 29 years has been at a lofty 7.11 times income, not too far from the current 9.44 times income. The same holds true for San Francisco. Its historical average is 7.57 versus the current 9.24 times income.
Even the global cities of Miami and New York are well within their historical averages. Miami's affordability ratio for 2018 was 6.06 times income - not far from its historical average of 4.71. New York's affordability ratio for 2018 was 5.25 times income - a shade below its historical average of 5.26 times income.
So where are the bubbilicious markets? Where have home prices strayed very far from their historical affordability ratios? Does Midland, TX come to mind? How about Lubbock, TX? Birmingham, AL? All these places had affordability ratios of less than 4 times income in 2018 - below the US national average of 4.13 times income. But all are solidly in bubble land with affordability ratios more than 2 times their historical averages since 1990.
Midland, TX ratio stood at 3.08 in 2018 - almost three standard deviations away from its historical mean of just 2.33 times income. The probability of the ratio going higher is just 0.17%. Lubbock's ratio of 3.03 times income in 2018 is 2.58 standard deviations away from its historical mean of just 2.59 times income, giving an upside probability of 0.49%. Birmingham, AL's upside is slightly better 0.64% because its 2018 affordability ratio of 3.86 times income is 2.49 standard deviations away from its historical mean of 3.34 times income.
According to data tabulated by Harvard University's Joint Center for Housing Studies, 37 metro areas out of 382 metros are in bubble markets:
None of them, with the exception of San Jose, CA of Silicon Valley, are in obvious real estate bubbles.
Will their affordability ratios normalize or have they reached a permanently higher plateau? Only time will tell. But if they do, the results can be just as catastrophic for the homeowners.
Only three metro areas out of 382 are in a depression. Their affordability ratios in 2018 were way below their historical mean:
Source: State of the Nation's Housing, Joint Center for Housing Studies, Harvard University
Yet those real estate markets are not technically in a bubble, and their ratios are just a shade over one standard deviation of their historical house price to income ratios. For instance, LA's historical ratio for the past 29 years has been at a lofty 7.11 times income, not too far from the current 9.44 times income. The same holds true for San Francisco. Its historical average is 7.57 versus the current 9.24 times income.
Even the global cities of Miami and New York are well within their historical averages. Miami's affordability ratio for 2018 was 6.06 times income - not far from its historical average of 4.71. New York's affordability ratio for 2018 was 5.25 times income - a shade below its historical average of 5.26 times income.
| Median House Price to Median Income Ratios | ||||
| Metropolitan Area | 2018 | Mean | Std Dev | Z Score |
| Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA | 9.44 | 7.11 | 2.14 | 1.09 |
| San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward, CA | 9.24 | 7.57 | 1.65 | 1.01 |
| Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL | 6.06 | 4.71 | 1.54 | 0.88 |
| New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA | 5.25 | 5.26 | 1.17 | -0.01 |
So where are the bubbilicious markets? Where have home prices strayed very far from their historical affordability ratios? Does Midland, TX come to mind? How about Lubbock, TX? Birmingham, AL? All these places had affordability ratios of less than 4 times income in 2018 - below the US national average of 4.13 times income. But all are solidly in bubble land with affordability ratios more than 2 times their historical averages since 1990.
Midland, TX ratio stood at 3.08 in 2018 - almost three standard deviations away from its historical mean of just 2.33 times income. The probability of the ratio going higher is just 0.17%. Lubbock's ratio of 3.03 times income in 2018 is 2.58 standard deviations away from its historical mean of just 2.59 times income, giving an upside probability of 0.49%. Birmingham, AL's upside is slightly better 0.64% because its 2018 affordability ratio of 3.86 times income is 2.49 standard deviations away from its historical mean of 3.34 times income.
According to data tabulated by Harvard University's Joint Center for Housing Studies, 37 metro areas out of 382 metros are in bubble markets:
None of them, with the exception of San Jose, CA of Silicon Valley, are in obvious real estate bubbles.
Will their affordability ratios normalize or have they reached a permanently higher plateau? Only time will tell. But if they do, the results can be just as catastrophic for the homeowners.
Only three metro areas out of 382 are in a depression. Their affordability ratios in 2018 were way below their historical mean:
- Cape Girardeau, MO
- Beckley, WV
- Decatur, IL
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
































