After a 10.12% market correction from its peak of 350.31 in the 3rd Quarter of 2015, Hong Kong home prices bottomed out in the first half of 2016 to 314.84 (2016 Q1) and 315.30 (2016 Q2). In the third quarter of 2016, they resumed their relentless upward trend, jumping 6.91% in just one quarter to reach 337.09% but still below the peak of 350.31 posted in the 3rd Quarter of 2015.
How low can Hong Kong Property Prices Go? Some Clues from the Not Too Distant Past
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Showing posts with label Bubble. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bubble. Show all posts
Friday, January 27, 2017
Friday, June 10, 2016
How low can Hong Kong Property Prices Go? Some Clues from the Not Too Distant Past.
Last January 8, 2016, in a post titled "Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand Post Flat to Declining Housing Prices, Can the Philippines and Indonesia be Not Far Behind? - 2nd Qtr 2015", we showed the remarkable run-up in housing prices in Asia, often outpacing inflation by a wide margin. One of the countries featured was Hong Kong, whose real estate prices have jumped by 234.46% in a little over ten years, outpacing inflation by a staggering 207.16% as of the second quarter of 2015.
Little did we know that property prices peaked a quarter later, in the third quarter of 2015. Since then, Hong Kong property prices have entered a correction phase, dropping by 10.12% in the two quarters since then.
When we go back to charts with historical data dating back to 1980, we find that such corrections can sometimes presage a bear market in properties. The last major bear market started in October 1997, several months after Hong Kong was handed over back to China from the U.K., lasting an arduously long 69 months or almost six years. During this phase, prices dropped a gut-wrenching 66.22% in all classes, dipping below their inflation-adjusted levels for two quarters in 2003. The bear market took place during the financial contagion that occurred during the Asian Financial Crisis.
Hong Kong Property Price Indices are broken down by property class. Property classes are defined by the property's area.

Here's the same chart on a monthly basis:
A similar dynamic has taken place in the recent market decline. It was the Class A properties that declined the most, followed by the bigger property classes. With the exception of the period from October 1997 to July 2003, the smaller property classes were more stable.
This is born out by the historical price volatility of each property class, as demonstrated by the chart below:
The recent large price swings for the smaller property classes have been outside recent historical norms.
As seen in the chart above, there were quite a few times when the annual change in the property price indices was more than two standard deviations beyond the mean, the most recent being in 2010 when the A Class posted an annual gain of 26.77%. Under a normal probability distribution, this does not happen 95% of the time.
These smaller properties are generally held by small retail investors who tend to purchase properties for their own use. As a result, volatility is usually lower among the smaller property classes. The large run-up and decline in these smaller property classes in recent times indicates that the buying was driven by rampant speculation rather than real consumption. And that always ends badly.
So, how low can Hong Kong property price indices go? Your guess is as good as ours. But given the spectacular price increases from December 2008 to September 2015, it wouldn't be beyond us to think that the prices could revert back to their inflation adjusted levels as they did in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis (October 1997 to September 2003), declining by more than 60% across all property classes.
Little did we know that property prices peaked a quarter later, in the third quarter of 2015. Since then, Hong Kong property prices have entered a correction phase, dropping by 10.12% in the two quarters since then.
When we go back to charts with historical data dating back to 1980, we find that such corrections can sometimes presage a bear market in properties. The last major bear market started in October 1997, several months after Hong Kong was handed over back to China from the U.K., lasting an arduously long 69 months or almost six years. During this phase, prices dropped a gut-wrenching 66.22% in all classes, dipping below their inflation-adjusted levels for two quarters in 2003. The bear market took place during the financial contagion that occurred during the Asian Financial Crisis.
Unsurprisingly, the last correction took place amid the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. The correction was short, lasting a mere seven months, from June 2008 to December 2008. Property prices for all classes dropped 17.22% - or almost a bear market (20% decline).
- Property Class "A": Area below 40 sq. m.
- Property Class "B": Area between 40 sq. m. and 69.9 sq. m.
- Property Class "C": Area between 70 sq. m. and 99.99 sq. m.
- Property Class "D": Area between 100 sq. m. and 159.9 sq. m.
- Property Class "E": Area above 160 sq. m.
Here's an annual chart of the various Hong Kong Property Price Indices by property class:

Here's the same chart on a monthly basis:
As evidenced by the chart below, the largest price run-up and decline in the last decade have taken place in the smaller property classes - the A,B, and C Property Classes. Class A properties have risen the most, rising by a staggering 225.19%. In the three bull markets prior to that, it was the largest property class, Class E - with areas above 160 sq. m., that have risen the most. The smaller property classes lagged behind,
A similar dynamic has taken place in the recent market decline. It was the Class A properties that declined the most, followed by the bigger property classes. With the exception of the period from October 1997 to July 2003, the smaller property classes were more stable.
This is born out by the historical price volatility of each property class, as demonstrated by the chart below:
The recent large price swings for the smaller property classes have been outside recent historical norms.
As seen in the chart above, there were quite a few times when the annual change in the property price indices was more than two standard deviations beyond the mean, the most recent being in 2010 when the A Class posted an annual gain of 26.77%. Under a normal probability distribution, this does not happen 95% of the time.
These smaller properties are generally held by small retail investors who tend to purchase properties for their own use. As a result, volatility is usually lower among the smaller property classes. The large run-up and decline in these smaller property classes in recent times indicates that the buying was driven by rampant speculation rather than real consumption. And that always ends badly.
So, how low can Hong Kong property price indices go? Your guess is as good as ours. But given the spectacular price increases from December 2008 to September 2015, it wouldn't be beyond us to think that the prices could revert back to their inflation adjusted levels as they did in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis (October 1997 to September 2003), declining by more than 60% across all property classes.
Thursday, June 5, 2014
8990 Holdings, Inc.: The Case of the Disappearing Past Due Installment Contract Receivables
In a previous blog post titled "Has the Philippine Real Estate Bubble Already Burst?", we wrote on a little known factoid buried deep within the bowels of the financial statements of 8990 Holdings, Inc. (otherwise known through its stock ticker "HOUSE"), that HOUSE's level of Installment Contract Receivables (ICRs) that are over 90 days past due jumped 500% in the nine months from December 31, 2012 to September 30, 2013.
| 8990 Holdings Inc. | |||
| Installment Contract Receivables, Past Due but Not Impaired | |||
| In Php | |||
| Audited | Unaudited | ||
| December 31, 2012 | September 30, 2013 | % Change | |
| Less than 30 days | 76,438,532 | 102,996,723 | 34.74% |
| 31 - 60 days | 31,128,884 | 30,426,033 | -2.26% |
| 61 -90 days | 26,930,290 | 10,163,708 | -62.26% |
| Over 90 days | 39,365,086 | 236,008,574 | 499.54% |
| Total | 173,862,792 | 379,595,038 | 118.33% |
These figures were taken from HOUSE's interim financial statements as of September 30, 2013 which contained audited figures for December 31, 2012 and interim figures for the nine months since then. The document can be found here and also on the website of the Philippine Stock Exchange. The Annual Report can be found here and here.
Today, those figures are very much gone or reduced. The level of past due ICRs were reduced by almost 80% for the very same figures that were audited as of December 31, 2012.
| 8990 Holdings Inc. | ||||
| Installment Contract Receivables, Past Due but Not Impaired | ||||
| In Php | ||||
| Interim Report | Annual Report | |||
| Audited | Audited | |||
| December 31, 2012 | December 31, 2012 | Variance | % Variance | |
| Less than 30 days | 76,438,532 | 18,426,966 | -58,011,566 | -75.89% |
| 31 - 60 days | 31,128,884 | 5,049,846 | -26,079,038 | -83.78% |
| 61 -90 days | 26,930,290 | 5,910,360 | -21,019,930 | -78.05% |
| Over 90 days | 39,365,086 | 6,357,158 | -33,007,928 | -83.85% |
| Total | 173,862,792 | 35,744,330 | -138,118,462 | -79.44% |
Despite an almost 40% jump in sales, the level of past due ICRs were even lower at year end 2013 than they were at year end 2012.
| 8990 Holdings Inc. | ||||
| Installment Contract Receivables, Past Due but Not Impaired | ||||
| In Php | ||||
| Interim Report | Annual Report | |||
| Audited | Unaudited | Audited | Audited | |
| December 31, 2012 | September 30, 2013 | December 31, 2012 | December 31, 2013 | |
| Less than 30 days | 76,438,532 | 102,996,723 | 18,426,966 | 3,824,739 |
| 31 - 60 days | 31,128,884 | 30,426,033 | 5,049,846 | 2,403,551 |
| 61 -90 days | 26,930,290 | 10,163,708 | 5,910,360 | 2,177,276 |
| Over 90 days | 39,365,086 | 236,008,574 | 6,357,158 | 15,993,266 |
| Total | 173,862,792 | 379,595,038 | 35,744,330 | 24,398,832 |
HOUSE dependence on ICRs to fuel sales has only increased since December 31, 2012.
| 8990 Holdings Inc. | ||||
| Installment Contract Receivables/Sales | ||||
| In Php | ||||
| Audited | Unaudited | Audited | Audited | |
| December 31, 2012 | September 30, 2013 | December 31, 2012 | December 31, 2013 | |
| Installment Contract Receivables | 4,672,109,197 | 8,165,199,990 | 4,672,109,197 | 9,777,920,990 |
| Sales | 2,888,596,423 | 4,367,429,533 | 3,830,644,048 | 5,356,098,815 |
| Days Sales | 437 | 505 | 329 | 493 |
So has the risk to its stockholders. 8990 Holdings Inc. |
||||
| Installment Contract Receivables/Stockholders Equity | ||||
| In Php | ||||
| Audited | Unaudited | Audited | Audited | |
| December 31, 2012 | September 30, 2013 | December 31, 2012 | December 31, 2013 | |
| Installment Contract Receivables | 4,672,109,197 | 8,165,199,990 | 4,672,109,197 | 9,777,920,990 |
| Stockholders Equity | 3,948,015,021 | 6,049,131,256 | 3,948,015,021 | 6,595,847,184 |
| Installment Contract Receivables/Stockholders Equity | 118.34% | 134.98% | 118.34% | 148.24% |
| 8990 Holdings Inc. | ||||
| Real Estate/Stockholders Equity | ||||
| In Php | ||||
| Audited | Unaudited | Audited | Audited | |
| December 31, 2012 | September 30, 2013 | December 31, 2012 | December 31, 2013 | |
| Real Estate Inventories | 2,040,532,596 | 2,081,143,259 | 2,040,532,596 | 2,243,559,834 |
| Land held for Future Development | 1,010,474,241 | 3,605,811,050 | 1,010,474,241 | 3,784,727,576 |
| Investment Properties | 142,365,067 | 140,860,631 | 142,365,067 | 141,928,584 |
| Total Real Estate | 3,193,371,904 | 5,827,814,940 | 3,193,371,904 | 6,170,215,994 |
| Stockholders Equity | 3,948,015,021 | 6,049,131,256 | 3,948,015,021 | 6,595,847,184 |
| Real Estate/Stockholders Equity | 80.89% | 96.34% | 80.89% | 93.55% |
| 8990 Holdings Inc. | ||||
| ICRs & Real Estate/Stockholders Equity | ||||
| In Php | ||||
| Audited | Unaudited | Audited | Audited | |
| December 31, 2012 | September 30, 2013 | December 31, 2012 | December 31, 2013 | |
| Installment Contract Receivables | 4,672,109,197 | 8,165,199,990 | 4,672,109,197 | 9,777,920,990 |
| Real Estate | 3,193,371,904 | 5,827,814,940 | 3,193,371,904 | 6,170,215,994 |
| Total | 7,865,481,101 | 13,993,014,930 | 7,865,481,101 | 15,948,136,984 |
| 10% Losss | 786,548,110 | 1,399,301,493 | 786,548,110 | 1,594,813,698 |
| Stockholder's Equity* | 3,948,015,021 | 6,049,131,256 | 3,948,015,021 | 6,595,847,184 |
| Impact of 10% Loss | 19.92% | 23.13% | 19.92% | 24.18% |
* Excludes Proceeds from Follow-on Offering
Impairment Losses
Based on its Annual Report, the company has now made provisions for impairment losses of Php 2,795,106 as of December 31, 2013, whereas they recognized none in the years before. This is a step in the right direction.
Meanwhile, what happened to all those past due ICRs?
Monday, June 25, 2012
Is There a Real Estate Bubble in the Philippines?
Editor's Note: This update reflects the true Real Estate & Construction Loans to GDP ratio published last June 25, 2012. The previous figures were published in error.
Is there a real estate bubble in the Philippines? Several people, including Finance Secretary Cesar Purisima and high profile businessman Andrew Masigan have asked this question earlier this year. Both have come to the conclusion that there is no real estate bubble - yet.
But does the data bear this out? Based on the data available from the banking system, if we are in a real estate bubble, we are only in the beginnings of one. Given the growth in our country's GDP since 1999, Real Estate Loans, on an absolute basis, have picked up noticeably since 2008, but construction loans have not.
On a relative basis, Real Estate and Construction Loans as a percentage of GDP have dropped considerably since 1999, from a high of 7.56% of GDP in June 1999 to a low of 4.43% of GDP as of March 2007. Today, that ratio has gone up considerably, and now stands at 6.46% as of September 2011. So Real Estate and Construction Loans relative to GDP have bottomed out but not have approached near peak levels of 7.56% of GDP. It is important to note that the availability of banking data available on www.bsp.gov.ph goes back only to March 1999. There previous peak levels could have been much higher.
| Philippine Banking System | ||||
| Real Estate & Construction Loans vs. GDP | ||||
| March 1999 to September 2011 | ||||
| In Peso Billions | ||||
| Quarter/Year | Real Estate Loans | Construction Loans | Real Estate & Construction Loans | GDP (Current) |
| March 1999 | 198 | 57 | 255 | 3,244 |
| June 1999 | 222 | 56 | 278 | 3,244 |
| September 1999 | 221 | 55 | 275 | 3,244 |
| December 1999 | 190 | 54 | 243 | 3,244 |
| March 2000 | 213 | 51 | 264 | 3,581 |
| June 2000 | 220 | 49 | 269 | 3,581 |
| September 2000 | 180 | 89 | 269 | 3,581 |
| December 2000 | 224 | 47 | 271 | 3,581 |
| March 2001 | 203 | 51 | 255 | 3,889 |
| June 2001 | 205 | 43 | 248 | 3,889 |
| September 2001 | 204 | 44 | 249 | 3,889 |
| December 2001 | 204 | 42 | 246 | 3,889 |
| March 2002 | 212 | 43 | 255 | 4,198 |
| June 2002 | 207 | 40 | 247 | 4,198 |
| September 2002 | 203 | 40 | 242 | 4,198 |
| December 2002 | 204 | 36 | 239 | 4,198 |
| March 2003 | 250 | 47 | 297 | 4,548 |
| June 2003 | 250 | 46 | 296 | 4,548 |
| September 2003 | 261 | 48 | 309 | 4,548 |
| December 2003 | 262 | 47 | 310 | 4,548 |
| March 2004 | 260 | 53 | 312 | 5,120 |
| June 2004 | 257 | 37 | 294 | 5,120 |
| September 2004 | 255 | 36 | 291 | 5,120 |
| December 2004 | 262 | 36 | 297 | 5,120 |
| March 2005 | 252 | 41 | 293 | 5,678 |
| June 2005 | 253 | 35 | 289 | 5,678 |
| September 2005 | 268 | 35 | 304 | 5,678 |
| December 2005 | 258 | 34 | 293 | 5,678 |
| March 2006 | 273 | 33 | 306 | 6,271 |
| June 2006 | 288 | 33 | 321 | 6,271 |
| September 2006 | 284 | 33 | 318 | 6,271 |
| December 2006 | 291 | 34 | 325 | 6,271 |
| March 2007 | 272 | 34 | 305 | 6,893 |
| June 2007 | 287 | 37 | 324 | 6,893 |
| September 2007 | 285 | 37 | 321 | 6,893 |
| December 2007 | 290 | 36 | 326 | 6,893 |
| March 2008 | 290 | 30 | 320 | 7,721 |
| June 2008 | 339 | 34 | 373 | 7,721 |
| September 2008 | 358 | 37 | 396 | 7,721 |
| December 2008 | 400 | 41 | 441 | 7,721 |
| March 2009 | 393 | 32 | 426 | 8,026 |
| June 2009 | 418 | 31 | 449 | 8,026 |
| September 2009 | 420 | 32 | 452 | 8,026 |
| December 2009 | 448 | 33 | 481 | 8,026 |
| March 2010 | 455 | 34 | 488 | 9,003 |
| June 2010 | 465 | 35 | 500 | 9,003 |
| September 2010 | 466 | 35 | 502 | 9,003 |
| December 2010 | 497 | 36 | 534 | 9,003 |
| March 2011 | 521 | 37 | 558 | 9,361 |
| June 2011 | 542 | 40 | 581 | 9,361 |
| September 2011 | 564 | 41 | 605 | 9,361 |
| Source: www.bsp.gov.ph and www.nscbgov.ph | ||||
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